Getting on top of things

Welcome to The Infonomics Letter for June 2010. Once again, my time management has failed me and it is launching on July second.

The production delay is the direct result of what appears to be another catastrophe in governance of IT. Those who have been reading The Infonomics Letter may remember the last use of such language in relation to the disastrous implementation by the Australian Customs Department of a new system for controlling imports into Australia. That time, imports into the nation were virtually halted for a period of three weeks, at the busiest time of the year. Now we have the case of the Queensland Department of Health, for which a new payroll system has generated almost continuous headlines since its launch in March.

One key difference between IT failure in government and similar events in the private sector is the level of scrutiny and enforced accountability. When IT goes wrong in business, the press may get an idea of what has happened, but typically the real detail is kept well buried. In government, the press and other stakeholders will insist that parliament discovers and discloses what went wrong. In Queensland, it is the job of the Auditor-General to investigate, report and recommend improvement.

Just as the Australian National Audit Office report on the Customs fiasco of 2005 took on the "can't put it down" characteristics of a Stephen King novel, so too does the Auditor-General of Queensland's report number 7 for 2010 create the simultaneous desire to put it away in despair of the failures catalogued, and the grim fascination of reading on to discover if there could have been any more profound failure to understand the very basic elements of governance, and spare 78,000 health employees the agony of wondering if their pay would ever be reliable again.

But while the audit report is once again a catalogue of governance failure, it probably could have gone further. In "Another Governance Catastrophe", we explore the deeper issues that the Auditor-General has not explicitly covered.

There's much more in the June Infonomics Letter. It's now easier to find the Spanish version. There is wrap-up of Infonomics recent activity including a new presentation on governance of IT in the green context available for download. We touch briefly on two intriguing security risks; we announce a key new education partnership and a raft of events in Europe, Australia and New Zealand to help all business leaders understand and develop skills in governance of IT.

Mark Toomey
2 July 2010

Another Governance Catastrophe

Governments in most parts of the world are under pressure to be more efficient in their use of taxpayer funds and delivery of services. In pursuit of these goals, many seek to make more efficient and effective use of IT by centralising and standardising the basic administrative systems such as accounting, human resource management and payroll. But the theory and the practice are sometimes worlds apart, as the government of the Australian state of Queensland has been learning in the hardest possible way.

Queensland Health operates the states public health system, and employs 78,000 people in extremely diverse roles. Since its new payroll system went live on 14 March 2010, Queensland Health has held a prominent place in news headline counts – mostly focused on payroll problems. Now, a new report by the Auditor-General of Queensland explains what has gone wrong.

The 57 page report covers governance and control of information systems in the Queensland government, but the major part of the report is devoted to the Queensland Health Payroll project. The report is easily read and needs no further summarisation here. But its conclusions, while profound in their own right, could go further.

To implement its standardisation of administrative systems, Queensland established a new entity called CorpTech, initially within the Treasury Department and subsequently in the Department of Public Works. CorpTech was formed in July 2003 and delivered the first of the intended shared systems, based on SAP software, for the Department of Justice in July 2006. As a shared services provider, CorpTech was a supplier to the Department of Justice. But the project was not regarded as having been run effectively, and a decision was taken to engage an external services organisation to be responsible for delivery of new systems. IBM won the role of delivery services provider in a competitive tender, with a contract being finalised early in December 2007. Implementation of the Department of Health Payroll system began soon after.

The audit report makes it clear that the governance arrangements were flawed from the outset. Just how flawed becomes very clear when we look at the project through the lens of the principles for good governance set out in ISO 38500.

Responsibility

ISO 38500 advises that individuals and groups should clearly understand and accept their responsibilities for both the supply and demand aspects of IT. It follows that responsibility for IT should be clearly and appropriately allocated.

Repeated references are made in the audit report to poor allocation and acceptance of responsibility, with an associated lack of accountability. But the audit report only hints at a significant and fundamental issue in the organisational arrangements that may have caused the problem.

The audit report catalogues a litany of basic errors in assignment of responsibility for the project – in particular assigning much of the day to day machinery of governance to IBM. But these issues are, while important, more likely to be symptoms of a problem that has not been extensively discussed in the report.

There are three parties to the Queensland Health Payroll system – CorpTech as the government entity charged with implementing standardised systems; IBM as the external contractor responsible for delivering the individual projects; and Queensland Health, as the organisation whose payroll systems were being overhauled. If we think about this clearly for just a moment, we can see that Queensland Health is responsible for the business outcome – accurate and timely payment of its 78,000 staff every fortnight. As the entity responsible for the business outcome, Queensland Health is the customer of the organisations that supply it with payroll processing services.

So who is the supplier to Queensland Health? Is it IBM, who have a contract with CorpTech? Certainly, IBM has responsibilities to deliver something, and since its contract is with CorpTech, so IBM must be seen as a supplier to CorpTech, not to Queensland Health. IBM would be obliged to deliver whatever is specified in its contract with CorpTech. There is a clear chain of delivery evident from the audit report – IBM delivers to CorpTech which is a shared service provider, and CorpTech delivers services on to Health. CorpTech must be regarded as the principal supplier of payroll services to Health.

But as we see from the audit report, this is not the way it worked. Health was almost completely out of the loop. Health did not have signoff on specifications, and did not participate in the governance arrangements for the initiative. CorpTech took all these tasks on itself, effectively behaving as if it were the customer and the agent for Health.

It appears that CorpTech was profoundly mistaken in its understanding of its own role. By behaving as customer instead of supplier, CorpTech subtly but effectively disenfranchised the executives in Health who should have been responsible for ensuring that the project delivered the capability needed by the Health Department. This changed to some extent in mid 2009 when the governance structures were revised and the QHIC Project Board was created, comprising executives of Queensland Health, CorpTech and IBM. But this was far too late to avoid the problems that had plagued the project because of poor specification, and it still meant that suppliers had

a substantial amount of power and influence over what was happening. The project was never on a positive footing and there would have been continuing tension between suppliers who were anxious to get to the end of the job and the real customer who wanted a business system that works.

Strategy

ISO 38500 recommends that the organisations business strategy should take into account the current and future capabilities of IT, while the strategic plans for IT should satisfy the current and ongoing needs of the business strategy. In practice, this principle extends deeply into the planning arrangements for current and future use of IT.

Queensland Government strategy was, from 2002, to standardise administrative functions. Finance, Human Resources and Payroll were among the key functions to be standardised. Having completed a handful of projects for finance and one for payroll, CorpTech moved on to tackle the Queensland Health payroll replacement, which had become urgent due to obsolescence of the previous system.

But all payroll systems are not equal. The strategy selected was to deploy the system that had been implemented in the Department of Housing, with minimal modifications to suit the Department of Health. But Housing has only 1,300 employees, compared to 78,000 at Health. The majority of personnel in Housing would be probably engaged in policy matters, working a standard 40 hour week, whereas in Health, the majority are health professionals working rostered shifts, with substantial complexity in allowances, roster design and other critical matters. The assumption that Health could adopt, with little change, a payroll system designed for Housing, was extraordinary in its naivety – but nobody picked it up. Perhaps one reason for this was that Health was not involved in the decisions at that stage – the choice was apparently made by CorpTech.

Clearly, the base strategy for the project did not align to the reality of Health's operations. But that was only one of several points where the project failed to ensure that plans met the needs of the organisation – in this case, the Department of Health. For example, the audit describes weaknesses in the approach to the Housing project in respect of the end customer departments understanding the impact of change and the work that they would have to do. Although attention to this particular issue was written into the IBM contract, the audit confirmed that the same problems arose again for Health. It seems that it was not until very late in the process, probably when the governance structures were revised, that Health developed any real comprehension of the substantial amount of change impact they would experience and the effort they would need to make to achieve a satisfactory end result. Even then, the final result is testament to the inadequacy of the work done and

confirms that the plans for the initiative utterly failed to address the totality of work required to deliver a complete, working business system.

At a broader level, it is clear that the Queensland Government's strategy of standardisation was seriously flawed. The concept of standardising administrative systems is attractive at first glance, but implementation of standard systems is an extremely complex task that involves vastly more than merely adopting standard software. Queensland Health struck the greatest contrast possible in functionality required for payroll by following a small department pilot with an urgent replacement in a highly complex department. What has become obvious is that the business system for paying personnel in Health is vastly more complex than the corresponding system in Housing. It is important to understand that the complexity is in the business system – not merely in the technology. Business systems comprise much more than technology – they involve people, processes, rules and organisational structures. If one wants to standardise, there is a non-negotiable imperative to address ALL of those elements. Technology is not a silver bullet, and no matter how many times we try, merely firing up yet another expensive technology campaign will not deliver smooth change and intended outcomes.

Standardising business systems across government requires an appropriate blueprint against which to plan change. Ideally, there should be a comprehensive standardised Enterprise Architecture for government dealing with all elements of the business system – the people, processes, rules, structures, information and technology. Such a reference architecture should provide, among other things, a baseline against which adaptability of individual agencies can be assessed, in order to establish whether standardisation is likely to be cost effective – let along feasible. The audit report makes no reference to any Enterprise Architecture having been used. This may be because the Queensland Government Enterprise Architecture Framework 2.0 was published too late – its copyright notice specifies 2009. We won't go into an analysis of the Queensland Government Enterprise Architecture Framework here, but readers interested in learning more about how Enterprise Architecture guides government in service improvement and efficiency might care to read a the briefing (in very readable business language) prepared by Dr Pallab Saha of the National University of Singapore entitled ["Enterprise Architecture as Platform for Connected Government"](#).

Acquisition

ISO 38500 essentially regards acquisition as the decision to expend resources – financial and human – on information technology. It suggests that the decisions should be made for valid reasons, on the basis of appropriate and ongoing analysis, with clear and transparent decision making, and appropriate balance between benefits, opportunities, costs and risks in both the short and long term.

It hardly needs to be said that the Acquisition Principle was violated comprehensively, from the beginning. The audit report makes it clear that there was little, if any, initial analysis. Instead, the decision to go ahead was based on knowledge that the old payroll system being obsolete and the experience of having done payroll for Housing. The assumption that there would be minor change was in hindsight fundamentally wrong – but even the most cursory analysis should have shown this to be the case.

The magnitude of the difference is reflected in the cost explosion in the project. While proper analysis and planning would certainly have resulted in the project costing less than it has done, there can be no doubt that it would have far exceeded the original estimate of $6.2m.

It is also noteworthy that the initial assessment and subsequent reporting of costs for the program appears to have been unclear and incomplete. To its credit, the audit report assesses the total program implementation costs at $64.5m, of which only $21m have been paid to IBM. One wonders how much, if any, of the costs now attributed to CorpTech and Health were actually estimated in the original business case.

Actually, the audit report makes no explicit mention of there being a business case for the Health Payroll project. It's not hard to surmise that none was produced – the assumption being that the project was mandated by a combination of the overall standardisation strategy and the obsolescence of the incumbent payroll system. However justifying an investment is only one part of the purpose of a business case: they should also establish confidence that the proposed initiative is feasible and achievable within the risk appetites of the stakeholders, and that the project can be reassessed for appropriateness at key control points.

Had there been a properly developed business case, with the appropriate stakeholders engaged and clarity on the key roles of customer and supplier, it is unlikely that the project would have gone ahead in its original form, let alone proceeded to the sort of trouble that was experienced by mid 2008. And, had there been a reassessment of the business case at any point on the journey, it would surely have become obvious that the project would need to be dramatically revised if it was to avoid failure.

Performance

ISO 38500 recommends that IT should be fit for purpose, providing the services, levels of service and service quality required to meet current and future business needs.

Clearly, the Health Payroll IT failed dismally in this regard. The service quality in payroll processing is far from satisfactory for a start!

But the Performance Principle is not merely about the operational performance of the specific IT elements – it is essential to consider the entire business system which is supported by the IT, and the business performance arising from the system and the investments made in it. Thus, the performance principle brings attention to overall business performance and realisation of benefits.

In the case of Queensland Health Payroll, there seems to be no indication of business benefits to be derived other than removal of risk associated with the old unsupported system. Since there was no appropriate initial analysis, it is unsurprising that there seems to have been no effort to improve or rationalise the actual payroll arrangements through reducing complexity or through adoption of better administrative practices around rostering, time recording and so on. With no such analysis, there would and could have been no serious estimate of benefits that might have accrued in Queensland Health, and no attention given to reform and improvement of the non-IT practices relating to payroll.

With no business improvement targets, the least one might have expected in the system was a continuation of the status quo in terms of manual workload and operational performance. But the audit report hints that higher levels of data quality rigour in the new system may have created new difficulties in achieving operational results, and technical performance constraints both appear to have contributed to business performance that is at best no better than the old system. The audit report shows that no useability testing was done, so the first payroll run would have delivered surprises as people in the process encountered its demands for the first time.

It's not hard to work out that failure to establish relevant performance criteria for the system and failure to put in place measurement protocols for ensuring that performance goals are achieved are two ways of contributing to project failure, by deferring the bad news until it is impossible to take appropriate corrective action. Clearly, at a minimum, there should be a comprehensive set of business performance goals set, addressing both the operational and business outcomes aspects of performance, and there should be substantial mechanisms in place to enable performance to be assessed and improved where necessary.

Conformance

ISO 38500 expects organisations to understand and apply relevant rules regardless of source, and to make clear and follow their own rules as necessary. The Health Payroll project should have followed numerous Queensland Government rules relating to project initiation, review, management methodology and so on. The audit report indicates that in fact, very few of these rules were followed.

It appears that engagement of IBM as external supplier may have contributed to this situation. Instead of developing business cases for each initiative (of which Queensland Health was to have been but one), there was a business case for the entire program of centralisation. Instead of negotiating a supply contract for each initiative, there was an overarching supply contract, where each task was quoted as a "Statement of Work".

While the Queensland Government has defined methodologies for program and project management, these were not followed. It appears that most aspects of program and project management were left to IBM. As would be expected with an organisation contracted to supply technology rather than business outcomes, it should be hardly surprising that the approach used did not ensure timely attention to the fundamental problems afflicting the project from the outset. Any audit of the initiative should have recognised that the defined methodologies were not being employed and should have triggered a more in-depth assessment to establish whether there was adequate control and an acceptable probability of success.

Human Behaviour

If the list of problems is too long and preventing your system from going live, it's best to make the problems go away! This simple philosophy has served project managers and vendors well for many years, but has also ensured that new systems deployments are as difficult and painful as possible. Human Behaviour includes our desire to be seen as successful, to meet the demands of our stakeholders, and to deny reality even when it is staring us in the face.

So it should be no surprise that one of the choices made under pressure to put the Health Payroll into production was to reclassify and downgrade problems that had been identified in testing. Of course, this didn't make the problems go away – it just allowed them to be experienced in production, with production volumes and pressures adding to their likelihood and impact! It's a fascinating but often seen human behaviour to defer dealing with problems in the interests of the appearance of progress, while hoping vainly that some piece of magic will make the problem benign, or even make it go away altogether.

Of course, this human behaviour as reported in the audit report came late in the project. There appear to have been numerous breaches of the principle, ranging from failing to plan for and manage the non-IT change elements of the initiative (the parts that involve real people doing real work in real organisational structures, all supported by the new

technology, to giving the suppliers significant control over the day to day management reporting and the overall control of the program.

Improving governance of IT in Queensland Government

The audit report specifies a number of documents as its references, including Australian standards for governance of IT and for risk management, Queensland Government Methodologies and the OGC Managing Successful Programs methodology. However, apart from the Queensland Government methodologies, it makes no specific reference to the guidance in any of these other references. Notwithstanding, they are useful and important guides for governance and management of IT in any organisation, and especially in large and complex ones, as found in government.

In addition to driving more effective conformance to its established methodologies, the Queensland Government would do well to embark on a program of profound behavioural change across government, especially in the top level ranks, to maximise its likelihood of successful achievement of service performance and efficiency goals. Top level leaders should demonstrate through their decisions and actions that they understand that:

- IT is an enabling resource for business systems, but is rarely the sole means by which business systems are changed;
- They are responsible for the decisions that lead to improved service and efficiency, and that as a consequence they are responsible and accountable for decision regarding the use of information technology;
- Plans they develop for the use of IT in government must be integral to the plans they make for evolution of government service itself, and that the plans they make for supply of information technology must be completely aligned to the government service plans;
- Every initiative that requires investment in information technology is a business change initiative that must be owned and delivered by an appropriately senior and accountable executive, addressing all dimensions of business change and benefits realisation as well as the delivery of the enabling IT elements;
- Constant assessment of progress and performance focused on achievement of intended business outcomes and results is an essential element of enabling top level executives and stakeholders to make key decisions regarding the future of both projects and operational systems.
- Clearly defined and appropriate rules must be backed up by comprehensive education, conformance and consequence regimes to ensure that deviations from the rules are infrequent and readily justified.

- Regardless of rules, management controls and other disciplines, the needs and behaviour of people as individuals and as groups are pivotal elements in decision-making at all levels, and can greatly affect the likelihood and cost of success.

At this stage, those readers who have invested in Waltzing with the Elephant might be wondering how different the Queensland Health outcome might have been if those responsible, and those who should have been responsible, had read the book. Perhaps we can hope at least that future leaders of major change will take the time to learn how to govern IT effectively.

Waltzing with the Elephant is Infonomics premier resource for board directors, executives and IT specialists who want to achieve effective top level governance of IT, maximising value and effectively controlling the risk of investment in IT. Reviews and a preview of the book are available at the Infonomics Website.

Waltzing with the Elephant is a publication of Infonomics Pty Ltd, and is available for purchase from The Infonomics Shop in paperback and downloadable e-book editions.

ISO 38500 Review

ISO 38500 was published early in June 2008 – just over two years ago. Now the international working group responsible for the standard is working on a review. The revised document will go through at least two stages of review before it is put to the vote. The first of those drafts – a "Working Draft", or WD, will probably be released during July.

Broadly, the working group believes that ISO 38500 needs no fundamental change – the model and principles presented in the standard are appropriate to governance of IT in all organizations, everywhere. However, observation and experience of the standard being used in the field shows that some of the concepts require clearer explanation.

Look for news of the WD becoming available for review at www.infonomics.com.au. A further announcement will be made in the July edition of The Infonomics Letter.

Information Risk

We all know that information security is a critical issue for most organizations. Long gone are the days when viruses were merely a nuisance and most PCs gave full access to anybody who happened to turn them on. Information security concerns have transcended the errant teenage hacker who could win a job with a security company by showing prowess at breaking through supposedly impenetrable barriers. Now we have to contend with organised crime and possibly international espionage. What we used call hackers are now criminals who seek to steal the data that we hold and sell it to the highest bidder; to hijack our business processes and deliver benefit to themselves;

and to disrupt our business operations denying our customers access to the services they require and denying us the right to earn a legitimate income through delivering those services.

Perhaps one reason that cyber-crime has become such a significant issue for all levels of business and government is that the most successful criminals are innovators. Constantly faced with the prospect of being discovered, criminals are persistently reinventing their techniques to disguise their activity and to discover new ways of making an illegitimate profit or to disrupt their targets.

And as innovators, the criminals are unafraid of the one thing that is crucial to their success – the technology we often so innocently deploy in our organisations to serve our own priorities. For them, the consequences of pushing the technology beyond its limits are minimal. If the technology breaks and they can go no further, their only care is to try to gain access a different way. If the technology lets them past the protections we have put in place, they have a new path to what they regard as success.

The protections we put in place, though, are often not enough. We leave space for criminals to enter – potentially with no trace. It's like putting deadlocks on the front door and leaving the back one always open. Criminals will find a way in and exploit that way to realise whatever gain they can.

Unfortunately, too many of us do not think like criminals and we do not take the time to contemplate the criminal opportunities that arise from the information technology we put in place. Two recent news items highlight the risk that we often don't contemplate.

In my home state of Victoria, and in many other parts of the world, utility companies are installing "smart meters". Inbuilt information technology allows meters to provide consumers with new insight to their energy consumption, while also providing the energy supplier with new access to usage data. They can enable variable billing based on factors such as time of day. But reports show that smart meters have only rudimentary security, such that criminals can change data on consumption and pricing quite easily. If such misuse was limited to just a few top notch IT people we might accept the risk and cost and leave the security at the basic level. But if the misuse were to be escalated to a grand scale through black market activity, we would realise, perhaps too late, just how much security is required. ***How many ways could people with improper intent access and manipulate the technology that your organization deploys outside its operational boundaries?***

CBS published Copy Machines, a Security Risk? on 19 April 2010. This sobering story explains that modern photocopiers are in many respects just like computers. They contain hard disc drives that store

images of the documents that are copied – potentially tens of thousands of pages of extraordinarily sensitive information. Where many companies have now recognised that obsolete computers must be data-wiped before being scrapped or recycled, many seem blissfully unaware that their photocopiers also must be data-wiped. ***How many other channels are there by which sensitive information could get into the hands of the wrong people in your organization?***

The Infonomics Letter in Spanish!

At last count, The Infonomics Letter was being distributed to business and IT leaders in 33 nations. For many readers, English is not their first language, and thus it is a delight that they persist. Some months ago, Carlos Francavilla, from Buenos Aeries began generously translating The Infonomics Letter into Spanish – making it more accessible to many readers in the South American region, in Spain, the United States and other nations.

Recently Carlos has made changes to his blog site to make it easier to find the Spanish translations which date from May 2009. They can be found at http://cafrancavilla.wordpress.com/infonomics-letter/.

If you are interested in further expanding our global audience and improving governance of IT all over the world, by translating The Infonomics Letter you're your native language, please contact the author.

Recent Activity

Brussels Briefing

Altran, a major consulting firm operating in Europe, Asia and the Americas, conducted a round-table event entitled "Unveiling the Secrets of I-Governance" in Brussels. In two separate sessions, leading journalists, business leaders and IT executives from Belgium's private and public enterprises and the European Union discussed the importance of and techniques for effective governance of information (and technology). In addition to the Altran website link above, more press discussion of the event can be seen at Solutions Magazine, Entrepreneur Today, Channel World, Computerworld, CIO-Club, La Libre Belgique and Le Mensuel d'AGEFI Luxembourg. Of course, virtually none of this discussion is in English, but it is pleasing to see that vital concepts and value of good governance of IT are gaining significant press attention – and particularly that significant amount of it is in the general business press rather than in the IT specialist journals. Several of the articles pick up the point originally made by Dr Raymond Young, that improved governance of IT should translate to a substantial boost in GDP, specifically through much higher project success rates and better harvesting of benefits from investment in IT.

Reinecke Review

We were delighted with the conclusions reached by Sir Peter Gershon in his report on the Australian Government's governance of information technology. However, while much has been done in action arising from the review, we still wonder when we will see the crucial culture shifts that Gershon specified as the essential change – culture shifts very similar in nature to the ones we have just described as essential also for the government of Queensland. When the government announced a follow-up review of how the Gershon Recommendations have been implemented, we hoped there would be an opportunity to contribute to that review on what we perceive as the gap between the expectations of ISO 38500 and the reality of the Australian Government's governance of IT. But since the Reinecke review was announced in April, we've been unable to find a path leading to the door of his review. Early in June we concluded that the best bet would be to write to Dr Reinecke via the agency which is responsible for the Gershon actions, but there is no indication of whether the comments were received, or considered. We'll give it a little time to see what, if anything is published, and we might publish the key thoughts in a future edition of The Infonomics Letter.

Kuala Lumpur Training

Seventeen senior IT practitioners from diverse industry and government backgrounds in Malaysia and Kuwait participated in the two day Infonomics foundation class on governance of IT in Kuala Lumpur on June 24th and 25th. This was the third and best attended of what is becoming a regular event for Expitris Worldwide Sdn Bhd.

Green IT Week

International Green IT Awareness Week, organised by Computers Off went ahead as planned on June 1. The virtual event attracted 300 participants from 37 countries. All sessions are now continuously available for viewing via the conference website. Registration is necessary for viewing, but there are no charges for access to the entire set of presentations, several of which give significant information about improving the environmental performance of IT. In addition to the conference site, the Infonomics briefing *Application of ISO 38500 to the Green IT Agenda*, which runs for 50 minutes, can be downloaded from the Infonomics Events page.

Coming Events

One of the central pillars of Infonomics activity is building awareness, understanding and skills in governance of IT and ISO 38500, for directors, business leaders and IT specialists. The Infonomics education program is continually evolving, includes classroom, conference and open access events, and is frequently organised in conjunction with business partners operating around the world.

Australian Industry Group Seminars

The Australian Industry Group is one of Australia's leading industry associations, committed to helping Australian industry to meet the challenge of change. To meet the needs of business leaders who need to control risk and maximise the value of their investments in information technology, Ai Group and Infonomics are collaborating to deliver a series of introductory seminars on governance and management of IT. The seminars will be in Melbourne on September 2nd, Sydney on September 7th and Brisbane on September 8th.

Other Events

July 26: Hamilton, New Zealand: ISO 38500 Master Class in conjunction with Basil Wood of BAZ IT Ltd.

July 27: Dunedin, New Zealand: Institute of Directors Otago Branch and Otago School of Business: Board/Executive briefing on Governance of IT.

July 29: Auckland, New Zealand: Not for Profit CIO Network lunch briefing on ISO 38500 and governance of IT. Contact Basil Wood of BAZ IT Ltd for details.

August 2 – 4: Melbourne, Australia: ISACA Oceania CACS 2010: Briefing on Audit and Governance of IT in a Post-Recession World.

August 26 (TBC): Melbourne, Australia: University of Melbourne guest lecture – details TBA. Alternate date 7 October.

September 22: Brisbane, Australia: World Computer Congress, South East Asian Regional Computer Confederation (SEARCC) Conference "ICT Leadership & Governance: Building a resilient organisation in a rapidly changing world".

There may be an opportunity to deliver an ISO 38500 masterclass in conjunction with this event. More details in the July Infonomics Letter.

October 5: Melbourne, Australia: ACOSM2010 - The Australian Conference on Software Measurement, in conjunction the International Software Benchmarking Standards Group's (ISBSG) Annual Workshop. This session will be tackling something different – *"Measuring the Unmeasurable: Governance of IT".*

October 25 - 29 (TBC): Madrid, Spain: ISO 38500 Two Day Foundation Class in conjunction with a leading university – details in a future issue.

November 1 – 5 (TBC): Europe or UK: ISO 38500 Two Day Foundation Class in conjunction with a leading industry partner – details in a future issue.